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Abstract
Labour norms are increasingly considered in trade relations, but is the protection of labour standards a necessary condi-
tion for export to the EU? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis, based on countries that export pineapples to the EU, shows
that labour standards protection matters in combination with distance, zero tariffs and institutional quality in a number of
cases. However, for none of the cases was it a sufficient condition on its own for determining exports to the Europeanmar-
ket. Rather, we show that (1) having a zero tariff is necessary for a relatively large share of export to the EU, and (2) labour
standards protection can make a difference when the institutional quality is weak in some African cases, in contrast to
Latin American exporters.
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1. Introduction
Fruits and vegetables consumed in Europe are sourced
from all over the world. The EU is the world’s biggest
importer of agricultural products, ahead of the US and
China (European Commission, 2015a). Increasing global
trade and competitive pressure have changed the na-
ture of food production systems in the South, with sig-
nificant implications for rural populations (Hurst, 2005).
Many private voluntary governance mechanisms now
regulate the social and environmental conditions in pro-
duction, with private labels increasingly addressing pro-
duction process characteristics, including working condi-
tions (O’Rourke, 2003). At the same time, interest groups
in Europe put pressure on firms to limit their use of im-
ports from countries with poor labour practices through
naming and shaming campaigns targeted at companies
which fail to comply with social standards in their supply
chain (Fair Trade Advocacy Office [FTAO], 2015a). Policy-
wise, labour norms are increasingly considered in trade
agreements, the aim being to make trade conditional
upon compliance with international conventions (Van
den Putte & Orbie, 2015).
Despite the growing interest in labour issues among
firms, consumers and policy makers, the importance of
social conditions, such as the protection of labour rights,
as a determinant for trade remains understudied (In-
ternational Labour Organisation [ILO], 2016; Kucera &
Sarna, 2006). Most publications follow a logic of cost ef-
ficiency to explain trade performance, revealing a race
to the bottom in labour standards (Hefeker & Wunner,
2002). A question yet to be clarified, however, is whether
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exporting countries that comply with labour standards
are rewarded with a relatively larger export share to the
Europeanmarket, especially in trade of agricultural prod-
ucts. We address this gap in the literature by questioning
how levels of labour rights protection, in addition to in-
stitutional quality, tariff regimes and exporting countries’
distance to the EU, affect the share of unilateral exports
to the EU. We argue that countries with better levels of
labour rights protection, high institutional quality, prefer-
ential tariffs and closer distance export a relatively larger
share to the EU. Along the same lines, a producer country
far away from the EU, without good institutional quality
and/or with low protection of labour rights, is expected
to export a less important share of produce to the EU.
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach
was used to determine the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a high dependency on the EU market for a
country’s pineapple exports. This approach differs from
the analysis of trade flows in gravity models (Kucera
& Sarna, 2006), because it allows causal complexity to
be addressed by testing several paths or combinations
that lead to the same outcome (see infra). We focus
on fresh pineapples, an important agricultural export
product in terms of traded volumes around the world
and export value. This case selection is rooted in the
labour-intensive nature of production and highly visible
labour challenges.
As will be explained in the next section, consumers in
the EUmarket are said to be particularly sensitive to eth-
ical and labour issues, and this is manifested at different
levels, such as trade agendas, private labelling and con-
sumer behaviour. In this article we search for evidence
that labour protection levels do indeedmatter for a coun-
try to trade intensively with the EU. The remainder of the
article is structured as follows. In the next section, the
importance of labour standards in trade is explained and
a theoretical justification is provided for the conditions
considered in this study. Section Three justifies the QCA
methodology and describes the data sources. Section
Four discusses the results before concluding the article.
2. Theoretical Justification for the Included Conditions
2.1. Labour Rights as a Determinant of Exports
Trade between countries may be conditional on prior
levels of respect for labour rights in partner countries
(Mosley & Uno, 2007). According to conventional wis-
dom, businesses are likely to prefer low labour cost pro-
ducing countries over labour quality because of com-
petitive pressure and profit concerns. This would in-
duce a race to the bottom in labour conditions (Kucera,
2001). However, recent literature has demonstrated how
labour rights can affect trade positively. Proponents of
a positive labour rights-trade hypothesis assume that
countries, or firms, purposely select partners that per-
form well in terms of labour standards because of rep-
utational concerns or external ethically driven pressures
(Greenhill, Mosley, & Prakash, 2009). Moreover, devel-
oped countries could serve as role models for devel-
oping countries through market integration, which can
result in the harmonisation of institutions and regula-
tory arrangements (Kucera & Sarna, 2006; Neumayer &
de Soysa, 2006). At firm level, Toffel, Short and Ouel-
let (2015) found better labour rights compliance among
suppliers serving buyers located in countries where con-
sumers are wealthy and socially conscious. In addition,
Distelhorst and Locke (2017) concluded that importers
favour doing business with companies that comply with
basic labour and environmental standards.
The debate has intensified over the last few years, not
least because of the devastating consequences of the col-
lapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh (Reinecke
& Donaghey, 2015). There are indications that both Eu-
ropean consumers and public bodies across the EU have
increasingly valued labour rights protection in their con-
sumer decisions and public policies (Mosley, 2017).
The consumer is increasingly being considered as
an important actor and driver of labour governance,
both through purchasing power and voice power (Don-
aghey, Reinecke, Niforou, & Lawson, 2014; Kolben, 2017,
in this issue). Stolle and Micheletti (2013, pp. 96–98)
point to the European Social Survey (2003), and the
Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy Survey in the
US (2006), which demonstrated that about 31% of all
people interviewed reported engaging in “political” con-
sumption behaviour. Purposely buying labelled products
(buycotting) and rejecting other products (boycotting) re-
flects the individual responsibility taken by consumers to
foster sustainable development. In the US, 28% of the re-
spondents reported engaging in such political consump-
tion behaviour, while in European countries the level is
higher, exemplified by 60% of the respondents in Swe-
den. A recent survey on behalf of DG DEVCO revealed
that 50% of the respondents (out of 27,672 in the 28 EU
member states) would be prepared to pay more for gro-
ceries (such as fair trade products) fromdeveloping coun-
tries to support people living in those countries (Euro-
barometer, 2016). The retail sales of fair trade products,
the world’s leading ethical label, also point to a relatively
high demand for labelled products in the European mar-
ket. Global fair trade sales were estimated at EUR 7.3 bil-
lion in 2015. The EU is the most important region for fair
trade products, accounting for almost 80% of the world
retail sales, with the UK (30%) and Germany (13%) be-
ing the leading buyers of fairly produced products, while
the US accounts for 12% of sales (Fair Trade Interna-
tional, 2016).
The EU has elaborated a trade and investment pol-
icy based on values in its latest trade strategy, “Trade
1 The Fair Trade Advocacy Office proposed actions to the EU to require “transparency in supply chains and a system of due diligence…that requires
persons placing products on the EU market to ensure compliance with labour, environmental rights of the country of origin. This could be applied to
agricultural products and also to textiles” (FTAO, 2015b, p. 9).
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for All”. The Communication refers to the expectations
of EU consumers1 concerning respect for human rights,
labour rights and the environment during the production
of the goods they use (European Commission, 2015a,
p. 20). However, since most production occurs along
value chains that criss-cross developed and developing
economies alike, the Commission acknowledges the chal-
lenging reality of meeting these expectations. These ele-
ments are reiterated in the 2017 review of the EU trade
strategy (European Commission, 2017, pp. 2, 9–10). First,
high standards of labour protection are confirmed as
being fundamentals of the “Trade for All” strategy. Sec-
ond, the ambition to continue to make trade “a posi-
tive force around the globe” and to shape globalisation
to promote sustainable development with a trade policy
based on “EU and universal values” has been affirmed.
Third, consumer concerns are taken into account as “the
EU continues to pursue new avenues in making trade
policy more responsive to citizen’s concerns”. The Euro-
pean Parliament (2017) has confirmed these demands
from EU consumers in its resolution on the impact of in-
ternational trade and the EU’s trade policies on global
value chains, recalling that “no consumer wants to con-
tinue buying productsmadeby children or exploitedmen
and women”.
A number of EU trade instruments incorporate the
necessity to respect labour rights. In its Generalised
Scheme of Preferences plus (GSP+, see infra), the EU
grants beneficial market access to developing countries
that ratify and implement, amongst others, the ILO core
conventions (Velluti, 2015). In addition, all the new gen-
eration EU trade agreements, startingwith the EU–Korea
agreement in 2011, include a chapter on “Trade and Sus-
tainable Development”, in which the Parties pledge to
adhere to the ILO core conventions, amongst others (see
Van den Putte &Orbie, 2015). Finally, ad hoc instruments
have been developed to address labour rights violations
in specific value chains. For example, the Global Sustain-
ability Compact aims to improve labour conditions in the
garment industry in Bangladesh (Vogt, 2017, in this is-
sue). In addition to these trade instruments, the role
of and collaboration with private actors in labour gover-
nance have also received more policy attention and Cor-
porate Social Responsibility initiatives2 are increasingly
supported, directly and indirectly, by the EU (Knudsen &
Moon, in press).
Following this line of argument on the importance of
labour standards in EU trade, the article engageswith the
positive trade-labour assumption by examining whether
exports to the EU are conditional upon the level of pro-
tected labour rights in the exporting country. By confirm-
ing this assumption, we can broadly conclude that, in line
with claims made by policy makers, Europe is actually a
more social market. This also implies that exporting pro-
ducers and governments have an interest in improving
social conditions at firm and national level in order to
boost their exports to the EU. If the results reject the as-
sumption, we can conclude that the perception of the
European market as being very demanding with regard
to social standards is not in line with reality, resulting
in an overestimation of European consumer and retailer
power to raise the bar on social standards.
2.2. Institutional Quality as a Determinant of Exports
An enabling institutional environment attracts foreign in-
vestment and facilitates trade throughmore secure prop-
erty rights, contract enforcement and investor protec-
tion (Levchenko, 2007; Rodrik, 1996). Anderson andMar-
couiller (2002) showed that better institutional quality
leads to larger trade volumes. A similar positive influ-
ence of domestic institutions on bilateral trade flowswas
foundby Jansen andNordås (2004). Absence of good gov-
ernance, especially a weak regulatory framework, can be
an obstacle to trade (Méon& Sekkat, 2008). For example,
the decline in pineapple export share to the EU fromCôte
d’Ivoire since the mid-1980s was partly explained by po-
litical instability, high turnover of private and public insti-
tutions, withdrawal of state support for the agricultural
sector, and the civil war (Vagneron, Faure, & Loeillet,
2009). Institutions, as business facilitators, may also in-
directly affect trade through the relationship with invest-
ment (Pajunen, 2008). European importers particularly
value a positive institutional environment in-country, be-
cause a good judicial system makes it easier to do busi-
ness and facilitates contract enforcement (Richards, Gel-
leny, & Sacko, 2001).
2.3. Tariffs as a Determinant of Exports
Preferential or zero tariff rates in trade agreements can
foster exports through facilitated access to the European
market. Higher tariff rates for a specific product or coun-
try can work as a barrier, increasing export costs. How-
ever, the impact of tariffs differs by country and product
(Emlinger, Jacquet, & Chevassus Lozza, 2008).
The EU has developed a number of trade regimes to
manage access to its market. The EU provides preferen-
tial market access through bilateral agreements and has
elaborated specific trade regimes for developing coun-
tries. The latter aremainly unilateral trade arrangements
including “Everything but Arms”, initiatives providing
duty-free and quota-free access for the least developed
countries, the GSP, which allows vulnerable developing
countries to pay fewer or no duties on exports to the EU,
and the GSP+, which combines more generous market
access with sustainable development, governance and
trade conditionality. While the former colonies, mainly
referred to as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
group, long stood at the top of the EU’s “pyramid of pref-
erences”, their position has been eroded. This has been
a gradual evolution in which reciprocal (yet still asym-
2 For example, several member states are actively involved in promoting sustainable supply chains by financially supporting and participating in multi-
stakeholder initiatives such as the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (Initiatief voor Duurzame Handel, IDH) and the UK Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI).
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metrical) free trade has trumped the development aspi-
ration of the EU trade agenda (for an overview see Orbie
& Martens, 2016).
In general, the classical policy instruments, such as
tariffs, have lost much of their importance due to liber-
alisation processes and new trade agreements (Hefeker
& Wunner, 2002). Indeed, in 2014, about 71% of all
agricultural imports entered the EU at zero duty, repre-
senting a value of EUR 72 billion (European Commission,
2015b). This demonstrates that factors other than tariffs
are expected to influence trade with the EU (Emlinger
et al., 2008).
2.4. Distance as a Determinant of Exports
Countries that are located close to the EUare expected to
export more to the EU because of lower transportation
costs (De Groot, Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 2004).
Moreover, some of these countries may also benefit
from historical relations and development assistance to
strengthen their capacity in productive sectors through
infrastructure and human capital investment (Babarinde
& Faber, 2007). These historical ties may facilitate more
direct, stable export relations between producer firms in
the former colonies and buyers in the former European
colonisers (Emlinger et al., 2008).
3. Methodology
3.1. Case Selection
The fresh pineapple sector was selected due to its large
direct export flow with few processing steps in the value
chain, the labour-intensive production process, and the
increased consumption in Europe. Pineapples are pro-
duced in various countries, mainly on large plantations
dominated by threemultinationals: Del Monte, Dole and
Chiquita (Centre for the Promotion of Imports from De-
veloping Countries, 2015). The focal area for pineap-
ple production is Costa Rica, which is the largest fresh
pineapple exporter to the EU, accounting for 85% of Eu-
ropean supplies in 2013 (COMEXT, 2015). In fact, ACP
producers have lost a large market share while imports
from Costa Rica have multiplied over the past decade
(Vagneron et al., 2009), as Costa Rica started to cultivate
the MD-2 variety which is in high demand on the market.
The dataset used in this study consists of 44 pineap-
ple producing and exporting countries (i.e. actors or
units of analysis). The fresh pineapple export volumes
to the European market were derived from the United
Nations COMTRADE (2015) and Eurostat COMEXT (2015)
databases (HS code 080430). Countries with less than
500 metric tonnes of total export volume were ex-
cluded from the analysis because of their negligible eco-
nomic value, resulting in 26 valid cases—too few for
an econometric analysis and too many for an in-depth
qualitative analysis. Hence, a QCA modelling approach
was chosen.
3.2. Data Sources
3.2.1. The Outcome: EXP
The outcome is defined as the share of pineapple ex-
ports to the EU compared to other destinations. It rep-
resents the relative importance or dependency on the
EUmarket as a destination for pineapples in each export-
ing country considered in the model, which is quantified
by the volume of exported pineapples to the EU from a
specific country divided by the total pineapple exports
in that country for the year 2012. Our model does not
consider bilateral trade between individual countries as
could be done in gravity models; instead, it analyses uni-
lateral flows from the trade partner country to the Euro-
pean Union member states, which comprise one group
for this purpose, the EU market. Some countries, no-
tably in Africa, export exclusively or a large share of their
pineapple to the EU. In contrast, Latin American coun-
tries export only half of their total pineapple exports or
less to the EU as for them the US is an important market.
Asian countries mainly trade processed canned pineap-
ple, which we excluded from our analysis.
3.2.2. The Conditions: LAB, INST, TAR, DIST
LAB. There is no commonly approved index to mea-
sure and capture the different labour rights dimen-
sions (Anker, Chernyshev, Egger, Mehran, & Ritter, 2003;
Compa, 2003; Cuyvers & Van Den Bulcke, 2007; Teitel-
baum, 2010). Measures at firm level include wage, work-
ing time and occupational health and safety, which are
referred to as outcome rights (Barrientos & Smith, 2007).
At country level, the four core ILO conventions are gen-
erally mentioned, namely freedom of association and
the right to collective bargaining (referred to in the re-
mainder of this article as Freedom of Association and
Collective Bargaining [FACB] rights), no forced labour,
no child labour, and no discrimination at the workplace.
Out of these four dimensions we consider the collective
bargaining rights as the lever to improved labour con-
ditions in the agricultural sector where wages are low
and workers tend to be worse off compared to those
employed in other occupational sectors (Mosley, 2008).
These ‘enabling’ FACB rights are conducive to access to
outcome rights such as wage and working time (Barrien-
tos & Smith, 2007), yet the right to form an independent
workers’ organisation is still suppressed in many coun-
tries, especially in agricultural sectors where unionisa-
tion is low (Hurst, 2005). Neumayer and de Soysa (2006)
argued that globalisation is more likely to promote FACB
rights than the outcome rights.
The QCA model presented in this article uses the
most recent labour rights (LR) indicator (Kucera & Sari,
2016). The LR indicator distinguishes between two ele-
ments of workers’ rights: the legal ratification of the ILO
conventions (de jure) and their practical implementation
(de facto). The LR indicator consists of 108 distinct eval-
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uation criteria for de jure and de facto violations which
are grouped in five categories: (1) fundamental civil lib-
erties, (2) right of workers to establish and join organi-
sations, (3) other union activities, (4) right to collective
bargaining, and (5) right to strike. Factual information is
obtained from the coding of nine textual sources3. The fi-
nal indicator scores countries from 0 to 10 (respectively
the best and the worst possible score).
INST. The World Bank Governance Indicators are
widely used to measure institutional quality (Kaufmann,
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The indicators are based on
the opinion of a large number of enterprise, citizen and
expert survey respondents, including 32 individual data
sources. It consists of six dimensionsmeasured on a scale
of −2.5 to 2.5 (with 2.5 as the best score): voice and ac-
countability, political stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
The dimension rule of law was selected in this study be-
cause it captures the perceptions of confidence in abid-
ing by the rules, in particular the quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights, police and courts, which is
relevant in trade relations (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
TAR.Wecompared the trade regime and the product-
specific tariff line for pineapple applied to each coun-
try in 2012, derived from the TARIC database (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016). Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay fell under the GSP+
scheme. Benin, Thailand, Togo and Uganda had an EBA
agreement. Other countries had aGSP agreement except
for the USA for which normal tariffs apply. The GSP trade
regime did not guarantee zero tariffs for pineapple in
the case of China, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Philippines and
Thailand. Therefore we opted to account for the varia-
tion in tariff lines for pineapple. A dummy variable was
constructed for having a zero tariff rate.
DIST. This article uses the distance measures
developed by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) to determine the
distance between Brussels as Europe’s institutional cen-
tre and each capital city in the world (Mayer & Zig-
nago, 2011).
3.3. Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QCA differs in several respects from traditional statisti-
cal methods and is increasingly being applied in compar-
ative political research at country level (Giumelli & Van
Roozendaal, 2016; Pajunen, 2008).
First, the objective of the study is not to estimate if
a variable or an interaction term has a positive or nega-
tive significant effect on a dependent variable as in the
gravity model of Kucera and Sarna (2006), who found a
limited positive effect of FACB on total export trade. In-
stead, we seek to identify the different combinations of
conditions that lead to the outcome, the relative impor-
tance of the EU as export market, because it is theoreti-
callymore likely that various paths for specific cases bring
about this outcome.
Second, QCA and regression analysis have different
explanatory approaches, each of which lends itself to
different research questions and hypotheses (Vis, 2012).
QCA follows a causes-of-effects approach, because the
goal is to explain the different causal patterns in the
cases under study that produce specific outcomes (ef-
fects), such as dependency on the EU market for pineap-
ple exports in this study. Quantitative approaches adopt
an effects-of-causes approach, with the central objective
to estimate the average effect of one (or more) variables
in a sufficiently large sample. Hence, a QCA is well-suited
to address the question of why some countries are ex-
porting relativelymore to the EU andothers not, because
the outcome is probably shaped by combinations of fac-
tors and not by one causal model with individual factors
in isolation.
Moreover, QCA is especially appropriate for small to
medium n-samples where regressions are problematic
(Marx, Rihoux, & Ragin, 2014).We do not focus onworld-
wide bilateral trade flows (exports and imports between
all countries in the world) as in gravity models. Instead
we want to compare cases of countries having a high or
low dependency on exports to the EU, in particular for
pineapple as a labour-intensive agricultural product.
The essence ofQCA is to understand the combination
of conditions that is necessary and/or sufficient for a cer-
tain outcome. The QCA method focuses on relations of
implication (absence or presence of conditions), while in
regression models the causation is assumed to be linear,
testing hypotheses about relations of covariation or cor-
relation between the independent and dependent vari-
ables (Katz, Vom Hau, & Mahoney, 2005; Thiem, Baum-
gartner, & Bol, 2016).
A first advantage is that QCA allows for equifinality,
or in other words, different causal paths can explain the
same effect. This notion of equifinality is omitted inmost
mainstream statistical methods, which serve to assess
the average effect of one individual factor (Grofman &
Schneider, 2009). It is true that regression analysis can
also account for a combination of conditions through in-
teraction terms, but the interpretation is less straightfor-
ward than in QCA and the number of interaction terms
that can be included is limited (Vis, 2012). QCA cannot
simply be substituted by an interaction-based regression
model, because it is hard to deal withmany high order in-
teraction terms without violating statistical assumptions
(Marx et al., 2014). Even with interactions, regression
models are insensitive to the differences between neces-
sity and sufficiency (Grofman & Schneider, 2009, p. 669;
Vis, 2012, p. 173).
3 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State), Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (International Trade Union
Confederation—ITUC), ILO’s Reports of the Committee on Freedomof Association, Reports of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations, Reports of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, Country Baselines Under the ILO Declaration Annual Re-
view, Representations under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, Complaints under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, and the relevant national legislation
for non-ratifying countries.
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A second advantage is that QCA explains why specific
groups of cases fit with a combination of factors. More-
over, a coefficient might appear not statistically signifi-
cant in regression results or an extreme value might be
seen as an outlier, while it can still be informative and
crucial as a condition explaining the occurrence of a few
cases in aQCA solution (Grofman& Schneider, 2009; Katz
et al., 2005). QCA thus has the advantage that it has less
severe data requirements than regressions (Vis, 2012).
The following steps were adopted in the QCA ap-
proach. The number of cases complies with the minimal
number of cases needed for a QCA. This is calculated as
2k with k the number of conditions. As we consider four
conditions (see above), we need a minimum of 16 cases
to have a reliable solution. The 26 countries thus repre-
sent an intermediate N-situation, for which QCA is partic-
ularly adequate.
QCA is a set-theoretic approach to test causal com-
plexity based on the notion of sets, set membership
scores and set relations to find the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. A condition is considered necessary if
whenever the outcome is observed, the condition was
present. A condition is sufficient if whenever the condi-
tion was present, the outcome also occurred.
In a QCA model, the outcome and conditions are for-
mulated in terms of set membership, with a value as-
signed to each individual case, indicating the extent to
which it belongs to the set. This data needs to be cal-
ibrated using empirical information on the cases in or-
der to assign set membership scores that vary between 0
and 1. Membership scores are calculated using both crisp
set (0 = out or 1 = in the set) as fuzzy set approaches.
Fuzzy set models allow for partial membership in the set.
When calibrating the fuzzy set data, a threshold or point of
indifference (0.5) needs to be defined; this allows a qual-
itative distinction to be made in the case of membership.
Fuzzy sets also require the selection of anchor points be-
tween full set membership (1) and full non-membership
(0). From the three commonly used calibration methods
(theory-guided qualitative, direct and indirect), we apply
the qualitative approach that identifies meaningful an-
chors based on conceptual and case knowledge.
Through such a qualitative calibration method, the
fuzzy set anchor points determined the threshold values
for each of the four levels within a set: 0 (no member-
ship), 0.33 (partial non-membership, more out than in
the set), 0.67 (partial membership, more in than out),
and 1 (full membership) (Table 1). For the outcome vari-
able, the cases with an export share of less than 0.05
were recalibrated as “no dependency” on the EUmarket
for pineapple export (0), values between 0.05 and 0.3
were assigned to the “low dependency” subset (0.33),
values between 0.3 and 0.7 belonged to the “interme-
diate dependency” subset (0.67) and values above 0.7
covered the “highly dependent” cases (1). The point of
indifference for the fuzzy set “many labour rights viola-
tions” is considered in the middle of the scale as 0.5,
meaning that cases passing this threshold are more in
the set (1) than out (0). For the crisp set enabling insti-
tution, the cases with a value below −0.50 on the orig-
inal scale of −2.5 to 2.5 were recalibrated to zero (no
enabling institutions) and above −0.5 to 1 (enabling in-
stitutions). The dummy of tariff rates is already binary
and did not have to be recalibrated. The distance to the
EU over 10,000 km was calibrated as “very far” (1), be-
tween 6,000 and 10,000 km as “far” (0.67), between
4,000 and 6,000 km as “intermediate” (0.33), and less
than 4,000 km as “close” (0).
Table A1 of the annex compares the calibrated data
used in the analysis with raw data values. The fit of a
QCA is measured by its consistency and coverage. ”Con-
sistency” measures the degree to which a relation of suf-
ficiency between a causal condition (or combination of
conditions) and anoutcome ismetwithin a given data set
(Ragin, 2006). Consistency values range from 0 (no con-
sistency) to 1 (perfect consistency). Once it has been es-
tablished that a condition or combination of conditions is
consistent with sufficiency, coverage provides a measure
of empirical relevance, or the extent to which this combi-
nation of conditions is covered by empirical cases. There
are three measures for coverage of different parts of the
solution in the case of equifinality (i.e. more than one
different solution path lead to the same outcome) (Ra-
gin, 2006). The solution coverage refers to how much is
covered by the solution term. The raw coverage (cov.r) in-
dicates which share of the outcome is explained by each
alternative path. The unique coverage (cov.u) refers to
the share of the outcome that is exclusively explained by
a specific alternative path.
The QCA package of the software programme R was
used to analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions.
4. Results
This section presents the results of the QCA model that
examines which (combined) factors are necessary and
Table 1. Calibration of anchor points for the conditions and outcome.
Set name Type Anchor points (range of calibrated values)
High importance EU (EXP) Fuzzy (0) < 0.05 (0.33) < 0.3 (0.67) < 0.7 (1)
Many labour rights violations (LAB) Fuzzy 0.5
Enabling institutions (INST) Crisp (0) < –0.50 < (1)
Zero tariff (TAR) Crisp 1 (zero tariff), 0 (no zero tariff)
Far from the EU (DIST) Fuzzy (0) < 4,000 (0.33) < 6,000 (0.67) < 10,000 (1)
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sufficient conditions for a high importance of the EU
market for pineapple exports. The first step in a QCA af-
ter calibration is to check for necessary conditions. This
is done separately from the analysis of sufficient condi-
tions, which is the second step.
4.1. Analysis of Necessary Conditions
The necessity solution is determined by a threshold of
consistency equal to 0.9 and the coverage should not be
lower than 0.5 (Ragin, 2006).
Table 2 shows one necessary condition for the occur-
rence of the outcome, namely zero tariffs, with a con-
sistency score of 0.937 and a coverage value of 0.527,
slightly above the corresponding threshold levels. When-
ever the outcome (relatively large share of pineapples
exported to the EU) occurs, the condition zero tariff is
present. This suggests that having a zero tariff is neces-
sary for a high relative importance of the EU market for
pineapple exports.
The analysiswas repeated for the non-occurrence (∼)
of the outcome and conditions, which is a qualitatively
different event than its occurrence. None of the neces-
sary conditions scored above the threshold level of 0.9.
4.2. Analysis of Sufficient Conditions
The truth table (Table 3) summarises all possible combi-
nations of the four conditions, here 16 rows, for the out-
come that the EU is an important export market. Each
row identifies the possible combinations of conditions
and the cases that belong to that combination. Some of
the rows in the truth table are empty because therewere
no empirical cases for these combinations of conditions.
Next, the truth table is minimised towards a con-
servative solution. For this purpose, an inclusion thresh-
old score for sufficiency of 0.75 or higher is considered
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012), which means that 75%
of the cases’ membership scores in a combination of
conditions must be consistent. Cases with a consistency
Table 2. Analysis of necessity for the (non-)occurrence of the outcome with consistency, coverage and relevance of neces-
sity values.
Consistency Coverage RoN
Conditions EXP ∼EXP EXP ∼EXP EXP ∼EXP
LAB 0.480 0.583 0.441 0.769 0.689 0.842
∼LAB 0.748 0.576 0.556 0.614 0.646 0.677
INST 0.469 0.522 0.385 0.615 0.619 0.722
∼INST 0.531 0.478 0.436 0.564 0.639 0.696
TAR 0.937 0.587 0.527 0.473 0.438 0.412
∼TAR 0.063 0.413 0.096 0.904 0.750 0.966
DIST 0.621 0.850 0.354 0.695 0.375 0.559
∼DIST 0.850 0.209 0.695 0.442 0.559 0.823
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions; EXP: high importance EU.
Table 3. Truth table for the importance of EU for pineapple exports with conditions TAR, LAB, DIST and INST.
TAR LAB DIST INST EXP n incl Cases
1 1 1 1 1 2 0.857 Panama, Colombia
1 0 0 0 1 3 0.856 Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo
1 1 0 0 0 1 0.749 Cameroon
1 0 0 1 0 1 0.732 Ghana
1 0 1 1 0 4 0.709 Costa Rica, Mauritius, South Africa, Uganda
1 1 1 0 0 1 0.449 Guatemala
1 0 1 0 0 7 0.440 Bolivia, Dom. Rep., Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Tanzania
0 0 1 1 0 1 0.187 Brazil
0 1 1 1 0 4 0.173 China, India, Malaysia, Thailand
0 0 0 1 0 1 0.080 USA
0 1 1 0 0 1 0.000 Philippines
0 0 0 0 ? 0 —
0 0 1 0 ? 0 —
0 1 0 0 ? 0 —
0 1 0 1 ? 0 —
1 1 0 1 ? 0 —
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions; EXP: high importance EU; n: number
of cases; incl: inclusion of sufficiency score.
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value higher than 0.75 were assigned a 1 in the outcome
for the minimisation process.
Table 4 suggests that the outcome is reached through
two solution paths, which is given in QCA notation4 as:
TAR*∼INST*∼DIST*∼LAB + TAR*INST*DIST*LAB⇒ EXP.
The first solution path suggests that the combination
of a zero tariff, being closely located to the EU, weak insti-
tutions and few labour rights violations are sufficient for
a high relative importance of the EU as an export market
for pineapples. This combination of conditions is found in
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. The second solution path
suggests that the combination of a zero tariff, enabling
institutions, distance far from the EU, and many labour
rights violations also suffice for having a high relative im-
portance of the EU market in the case of Colombia and
Panama. Whenever one of these two combinations of
conditions is present, the EU market for pineapple ex-
ports is relatively important. Moreover, the outcome is
not attributable to a unique factor or individual condi-
tion. Results suggest that the quality of institutions is less
relevant in theWest African exporters of pineapples com-
pared to the Latin American exporters such as Colombia
and Panama. The reverse is true for the protection of
labour rights, which matters more for the West African
exporters than for Colombia and Panama.
Regarding the model fit, the solution has a consis-
tency value of 0.857, a score that indicates that some
cases deviate from the conditional patterns. The solution
coverage is 51% of the cases, meaning that half of the
cases are not explained by the solution, which limits the
generalisability of the results. The raw and unique cover-
age values are rather low for both paths. The first path
is covered by more cases and is of more empirical impor-
tance than the second path.
In sum, the model confirms that a combination of
conditions (protection of labour rights, institutional qual-
ity, tariff regime and distance) explain the relative share
of pineapple exports to the EU market. Surprisingly, the
solutions did not cover as many cases of pineapple ex-
porting countries as we had expected. This result is
probably influenced by the outcome definition, because
West African producers heavily rely on the EU market
for pineapple exports, receiving a score 1 on the out-
come variable. These countries have few alternativemar-
ket channels except for local consumption. The market
outlets for Costa Rican pineapples are ample. Half of the
Costa Rican pineapples go to the US market. Defined
in the way it is, the outcome variable underestimates
the importance of the EU for Costa Rican pineapples,
which are market leaders in terms of volume exported
to the EU.
5. Conclusion
The protection of labour standards is increasingly rele-
vant for trade relations because of consumers’ ethical
concerns and corresponding attention paid by firms and
policy makers. The Europeanmarket is an important des-
tination for agricultural export commodities and Euro-
pean firmsmight favour countries with good labour stan-
dards to establish their global value chains in addition
to decisions based on cost logic. However, our under-
standing of the extent to which labour standards play a
decisive role in exporting to the EU is limited. The ad-
vantage of QCA is that it allows the combination of con-
ditions that lead to the outcome to be determined. In
our study, the results distinguished between two distinct
paths, contrasting African to Latin American cases. On
the one hand, the combinations of few labour violations
and weak institutions are sufficient in the case of Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. On the other hand, the combina-
tions of many labour violations and enabling institutions
are sufficient in the case of Panama and Colombia.
Our QCA analysis, based on countries that export
pineapples to the EU, shows that protection of labour
standardsmatters in a number of cases. However, it does
not always play a role, and it is never a sufficient condi-
tion on its own for determining exports to the European
market. Rather, we have shown that (1) having a zero tar-
iff is necessary for a large share of export to the EU, and
(2) labour standards protection can make a difference
when the institutional quality is weak.
The first finding highlights the relevance of preferen-
tial market access. Having zero tariff market access con-
stitutes a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a
relatively large export share to the EU. Interestingly, dis-
tance to the European market in itself does not appear
as a sufficient condition as it needs to be complemented
with other factors such as labour standards protection
and institutions. The second finding does indeed sug-
Table 4. Conservative solution of sufficient conditions.
Solution paths Inclusion Sufficiency Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Cases
Score
1) TAR*∼INST*∼DIST*∼LAB 0.856 0.302 0.302 Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo
2) TAR*INST*DIST*LAB 0.857 0.208 0.208 Colombia, Panama
Total Solution 0.857 0.510
Notes: TAR: zero tariff; LAB: many labour violations; DIST: far from EU; INST: enabling institutions.
2 In Boolean algebra +means (non-exclusive) OR, * stands for AND, while ∼ refers to the non-occurrence of a term.
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gest that labour standards protection canmatter but only
in combination with the quality of institutions. Specif-
ically, countries where labour standards are respected
have been relatively successful exporters to the EU mar-
ket even if the institutional context is weak (e.g. in Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire, Togo), whereas countries where labour
standards are violated will only have a large share of ex-
ports when their limited compliance with labour rights
is compensated for with a high institutional quality (e.g.
Panama, Colombia). Countries that do not manage to
compensate for their weak track record of labour rights
with a higher institutional quality (e.g. Honduras and
Guatemala) will not benefit from a larger relative export
share to the EU.
Further research needs to engage in amore profound
analysis of the interaction between the importance of in-
stitutional quality for determining export performance,
which has been well established in research on inter-
national trade, and compliance with labour rights con-
ventions. The finding that weak institutional quality in
the African cases did not hinder business probably re-
flects the political and economic relations which, histori-
cally, have facilitated trade with the ACP countries. In ad-
dition, the firm and retailer levels should be examined
more closely to determine how important compliance
with labour standards is in purchasing decisions and how
labour standards are monitored in global value chains.
Why and how exporters that respect labour standards
have managed to export successfully to the EU market
despite weak institutions (in African cases) remains to be
investigated more closely. Finally, it is unclear to what ex-
tent the findings can be generalised beyond the peculiar-
ities of pineapple to other agricultural commodities and
value chains such as garments.
We can conclude that even (Latin American) violators
of labour standards have a relatively large export share to
the EU, provided that they benefit from zero tariffs and
have good institutions. This calls into question whether
the image of the EU market as being very demanding in
terms of labour standards coincides with the purchasing
behaviour of importers, retailers and consumers, who
might not sufficiently reward or incentivise compliance
with labour standards at sourcing sites. Although the EU
is explicit in its discourse on promoting labour standards,
it appears to miss its intended leverage effect on actual
export decisions and consequently fails to drive higher
standards in sourcing sites.
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Annex
Table A1. Raw and calibrated data of the outcome and conditions.
EXP INST LAB TAR DIST
Case Cal. Raw Raw Cal. Raw Cal. Raw Cal. Raw Cal.
1 Cameroon 1 0.98 −1.04 0 15.61 0.56 0 1 15272 0.255
2 Côte d’Ivoire 1 0.98 −1.12 0 12.40 0.24 0 1 15126 0.216
3 Benin 1 0.93 −0.64 0 12.38 0.24 0 1 14948 0.180
4 Mauritius 1 0.92 −0.95 1 13.67 0.37 0 1 19453 0.927
5 Togo 1 0.86 −0.94 0 11.31 0.13 0 1 14979 0.182
6 Ghana 1 0.82 −0.04 1 12.02 0.2 0 1 15058 0.200
7 Panama 0.67 0.67 −0.23 1 16.67 0.67 0 1 18814 0.888
8 Dominican Republic 0.67 0.62 −0.7 0 13.81 0.38 0 1 17325 0.726
9 Thailand 0.67 0.52 −0.17 1 16.09 0.61 2.3 0 19261 0.917
10 Costa Rica 0.67 0.48 −0.47 1 12.9 0.29 0 1 19046 0.904
11 Ecuador 0.67 0.40 −1.16 0 14.17 0.42 0 1 19535 0.931
12 Colombia 0.67 0.38 −0.39 1 15.27 0.53 0 1 18874 0.892
13 South Africa 0.33 0.28 −0.11 1 11.68 0.17 0 1 19536 0.931
14 Honduras 0.33 0.10 −1.17 0 14.50 0.45 0 1 18916 0.895
15 Tanzania 0 0.02 −0.56 0 14.22 0.42 0 1 17242 0.714
16 Bolivia 0 0 −1.04 0 13.28 0.33 0 1 10261 0.958
17 Brazil 0 0 −0.11 1 14.07 0.41 2.3 0 19666 0.937
18 China 0 0 −0.49 1 10 1 2.3 0 17971 0.810
19 Guatemala 0 0 −1.1 0 17.08 0.71 0 1 19095 0.907
20 India 0 0 −0.1 1 16.83 0.68 2.3 0 16420 0.577
21 Malaysia 0 0 −0.51 1 16.65 0.67 2.3 0 10261 0.958
22 Mexico 0 0 −0.56 0 14.15 0.42 0 1 19259 0.917
23 Paraguay 0 0 −0.87 0 13.45 0.35 0 1 10417 0.963
24 Philippines 0 0 −0.55 0 15.81 0.58 2.3 0 10516 0.965
25 Uganda 0 0 −0.36 1 13.70 0.37 0 1 16219 0.540
26 USA 0 0 −1.6 1 14.57 0.46 5.8 0 15892 0.460
Notes: EXP: high importance EU; INST: enabling institutions; LAB: many labour violations; TAR: zero tariff; DIST: far from EU.
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